WILL IRAQIS FIGHT FOR THEIR COUNTRY?

One of the most persistent and important questions facing the U.S. government as we battle insurgents in Iraq is whether or not Iraqis will take it upon themselves to fight for their new country. We've heard a lot over the last year and a half about the on-going campaign to train tens or hundreds of thousands of Iraqi police, National Guard, and security forces, as well as the new Iraqi Army. It's clear from media reports that the training effort has had it's ups and downs. The most telling signal was when the military put General Petraeus (former commander of the 101st Airborne Division) in charge of the training of Iraqi forces. Clearly the earlier training had not lived up to expectations.

This has led many in the MSM to questions the reliability of Iraqi forces, implying that they are the modern equivalent of "Marvin the ARVN" (troops of the South Vietnamese Army) who didn't want to fight for an illegitimate government during the Vietnam War. Chris Mathews of "Hardball" on MSNBC has been very persistent in making that implication (most recently last night while interviewing Sen. Chuck Hagel of Nebraska...a Vietnam Veteran). Mathews obviously believes, and he represents many others who share the belief, that we are facing a popular, nationalistic insurgency, like Vietnam, that we cannot defeat.

The only way to prove that this point of view is inaccurate is to find evidence of Iraqis, in large numbers, coalescing around their new government, even to the point of being willing to fight and die for the new Iraq. Thus, the performance of Iraqi troops in operations like we are seeing in Fallujah is absolutely critical. George Will points out that this fact is understood by America's top commanders in the region.

...operations in Fallujah, and perhaps in three or more other Iraqi cities, may determine whether elections scheduled for late January midwife the birth of a viable state. And as the operations began, there was an expectation here that of the eight Iraqi military units collaborating with U.S. forces, three or four would perform reasonably well, two or three might reveal significant inadequacies and one might flunk the test. Military professionals have a realism born of familiarity with military history — America's (e.g., the U.S. Army's poor performance in its first major engagement of World War II, at the Kasserine Pass in February 1943) and others' (e.g., the disintegration, along ethnic and religious lines, of the Lebanese army in the 1970s). As events unfold in Fallujah, the two great questions are: In a region where there is little tradition of armies loyal to the state, can Iraq's military be reconstituted while a new Iraqi state is being constituted? And can this be done before Americans' patience is exhausted by the suspicion that the current Iraqi government is prepared to "fight to the last American"?

Will, reporting from CENTCOM, believes there is reason for optimism.

Success in Iraq, people here believe, is contingent on three ifs:

* if Iraqi military and security forces can stay intact during contacts with the insurgents;

* if insurgents are killed in sufficient numbers to convince the Sunni political class that it must invest its hope in politics;

* if neighboring states, especially Syria, will cooperate in slowing the flow of money and other aid to the insurgency. If so, then America can — this is the preferred verb — "stand up" an Iraqi state and recede from a dominant role.

(CENTCOM Commander General John)Abizaid, who speaks Arabic and has studied the region (and in the region, at the University of Jordan) believes that the Fallujah operation begins a 12-month period from which America will learn the parameters of the possible. When a visitor suggests that in two weeks we will know much, another officer tersely replies: "Two days." That was said on Monday. So far, the performance of Iraq's apprentice military, now working with U.S. units...permit tentative — very tentative — optimism.

When watching media commentators expounding about the latest instance of Iraqi troops performing poorly in battle, remember the military history that Will alludes to in this column. Remember that green American troops broke and ran during battles in the Revolutionary War, the War of 1812, the Civil War, World War II and Korea. In each case, the American troops were either poorly trained, poorly led, poorly equipped, or some combination of two or all three of those problems. In most cases the poor performance came at the beginning of the conflict. The only reason we haven't seen that happen in our most recent battles (Grenada, Panama, Gulf War I, Afghanistan, Gulf War II) is because we now have a professional, volunteer military. Each new cadre of troops is trained by combat-experienced officers and NCOs. Even units filled with green troops upon entering their first combat situation are commanded by officers and NCOs with prior combat experience. Add to that equation the overwhelming superiority in technology and firepower our troops bring to battle, even green troops can be put in a situation where they have all the advantages.

This is the key for getting the new Iraqi troops to perform well. Hopefully, our commanders will put them in situations where they can acquire combat skills while retaining all the advantages. As they face danger and succeed, confidence in their commanders and their own skills will grow. As this happens, one can hope that more Iraqis will feel a sense of pride in their accomplishments. Indeed, I believe that will be the most important cornerstone to be laid for the creation of a new Iraq.